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ARGUMENT 
STOKES HAS BASED HER APPEAL ON SOUND LEGAL AND FACTUAL ARGUMENTS 
AND SHOULD BE GRANTED THE RELIEF SHE HAS REQUESTED 
An appellant is entitled to respond in a reply brief to any 
new matter set forth in the opposing brief. See Utah R. App. Pro. 
24(c). In her opposing brief, defendant-appellee Mary J. Pulley 
("Pulley") requests costs and attorney fees, arguing that the 
entire appeal is frivolous. Plaintiff-appellant Christina R. 
Stokes ("Stokes") is entitled to respond to this new matter and 
each of the reasons given by Pulley as grounds for attorney fees. 
An appeal is only frivolous if it is "not grounded in fact, 
not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah R. App. 
P. 33; see also Matter of Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d 971, 976 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 309-310 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) . In contrast, Stokes has based her appeal on sound 
legal and factual arguments which also require reversal of the 
decision of the district court. 
I. Stokes May Raise Additional Issues in Her Brief that Were Not 
Raised in the Docketing Statement. 
Pulley argues that the first two issues on appeal should not 
be considered because they were not raised in the docketing 
statement. Pulley relies on Dairyland Insurance Co. v. State Farm 
Mutual Auto Insurance Co. , 882 P.2d 1143, 1144 n.l (Utah 1994) 
which is distinguishable and which has been superseded by Nelson by 
and through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah 
1996). In Dairyland, the Utah Supreme Court refused to consider 
issues raised by appellees who failed to file any notice of appeal 
or docketing statement at all. Unlike the appellees in Dairyland, 
Stokes has filed a notice of appeal and a docketing statement. 
More recently in Nelson, the Utah Supreme Court explicitly 
held that failure to list all issues presented for review in the 
docketing statement does not preclude an appellant from raising 
them in her brief. Id. The appellant in Nelson had filed an 
amended docketing statement, but the decision of the Court did not 
turn on that fact. Rather, the Court emphasized that "the 
docketing statement is for the benefit of the Court, not the 
appellee." Id. Since the docketing statement is not for the 
benefit of the appellee, Pulley would suffer no prejudice if the 
court were to entertain the first two issues on appeal. In fact, 
Pulley unexcusably ignores established precedent in making such an 
argument. 
Furthermore, in her original brief, Stokes requests direction 
from the court, and offers to file an amended docketing statement 
if necessary. If the court decides that filing an amended 
docketing statement is a prerequisite to raising additional issues 
in her brief, it should give her an opportunity to do so. 
II. Stokes Raised and Preserved in the Court Below Her First Two 
Issues for Appeal. 
Pulley also argues that the first two issues on appeal should 
not be considered because they were not raised and preserved below. 
Counsel for Stokes raised the first issue with the following 
argument at trial: 
. . . the second requirement is that [there 
be] mutual acquiescence in the line as a 
boundary. Okay, so there's two elements of 
this requirement, too. There's mutual 
acquiescence, and in treating the line as a 
boundary. 
In the mutual acquiescence facet of it, 
the way I interpret that—I think [what's] 
appropriate is that they both agree that 
that's a boundary, or should be treated as a 
boundary. 
Now for years, I guess, that land was 
owned by Pulleys on both sides of it, and it 
didn't seem to ever become an argument as to 
whether who owned what. . . . 
(R. 550, 1. 8-19.) 
In other words, counsel argued that the family relationship 
between the property owners is an important factor to be considered 
in the determination of mutual acquiesence. He did not articulate 
the issue as precisely as it would be later in the brief, and only 
in that sense was the issue "implicitly raised." Nevertheless, he 
brought the issue to the attention of the trial court and provided 
the court an opportunity to rule on its merits. 
The second issue challenges the factual finding that mutual 
acquiesence had occurred for the requisite time period. Obviously 
the issue was raised below since the court made a specific finding 
that mutual acquiescence had occurred from "at least 1946 to 1979— 
some 33 years." (R. at 315). A portion of that finding, regarding 
the time period up to 1967, is not supported by the evidence, and 
counsel for Stokes raised this issue at trial with the same 
language cited above. Stokes also raised the general issue of 
whether mutual acquiescence had occurred for the requisite time 
period in various memoranda, including her Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 102-101). 
Pulley points out that counsel for Stokes stated in trial that 
"it didn't seem to ever become an argument as to whether who owned 
what." It is apparent from the context that he meant there was no 
mutual acquiesence because the property owners did not acknowledge 
a distinction between the properties, and therefore did not 
recognize the fence as a boundary. 
III. Stokes Has Substantially Supported Her Argument for Applying 
a Presumption of Nonacquiescence Between Family Members. 
With regard to the first issue, Pulley faults Stokes for 
citing no authority from Utah or any other jurisdiction in favor of 
her argument. At the same time, Pulley fails to cite any authority 
against it. Since the issue has not come to the attention of most 
appellate courts, it is especially suitable for appeal. Stokes 
provides substantial authority to support her argument to extend 
existing law. 
Pulley also points out that only she offered evidence at trial 
regarding acquiescence in the artificial boundary. This has 
nothing to do with the first issue, which is a question of law. 
Also, this is to be expected since she had the burden of proof. 
Finally, Pulley also faults Stokes for comparing the doctrines 
of adverse possession and prescriptive easement to the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. Pulley contrives a distinction between 
the related doctrines that is simply specious. Pulley argues that 
boundary by acquiescence is a peaceful doctrine and that adverse 
possession and prescriptive easement are hostile doctrines. 
However, all three doctrines act as statutes of limitation, 
discouraging disputes and encouraging peace and predictability by 
limiting the time period in which a property owner may challenge 
the rights of an adverse claimant. 
In Jacobs v. Hafen. 14 Utah 2d 135, 137, 917 P.2d 1078, 1081 
(1996), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence has functioned like a formal statute of 
limitations. Also, in King v. Fronk, 378 P. 2d 893, 896 (Utah 
1963), the Utah Supreme Court compared boundary by acquiesence to 
"the concept of settling titles by prescription," explaining that 
the philosophy behind both is that after some time a property owner 
who never objects to the occupation of the property by another 
loses the right to challenge that occupation. The same is true of 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. In Peters v. Juneau-
Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 831-834 (Alaska 1974), 
the Alaska Supreme Court explained that "the purpose of the various 
requirements of adverse possession . . . is to put [the owner] on 
notice of the hostile nature of the possession so that he, the 
owner may take steps to vindicate his rights by legal action." In 
other words, all three doctrines assume that the property owner and 
another who occupies the property have adverse claims that have 
gone unlitigated for a long period of time. It makes no sense to 
call one doctrine peaceful and the others hostile. 
In fact, the hostility requirement in adverse possession cases 
is sometimes stated in terms of acquiescence. For example, in 
Peters, 519 P.2d at 832-833, a case often cited as an authority on 
the hostility requirement, the court explained that hostility 
depends on "whether or not the claimant acted toward the land as if 
he owned it," and then "[t]he whole doctrine of title by adverse 
possession rests upon the acquiescence of the owner in the hostile 
acts and claims of the person in possession." Jd. Thus, the 
mutual acquiescence requirement in boundary by acquiescence and the 
hostility requirement in adverse possession and prescriptive 
easement are the same. Both require acquiescence in the adverse 
use of the property by another. Both are defeated by permissive 
use, or nonacquiescence, where the party occupying the property 
does so without claiming a right to it. 
Therefore, the presumption of permissive use between family 
members in adverse possession cases is just as applicable in 
boundary by acquiescence cases. When a family member occupies the 
property of another up to an artificial boundary, it should be 
presumed that she does so with permission and without claiming the 
property for herself. 
IV. Stokes Marshalled the Evidence and Properly Challenged the 
Factual Determination of the Trial Court. 
With regard to the second issue, Pulley primarily argues that 
Stokes failed to marshall the evidence. Pulley argues this 
repeatedly as though she cannot emphasize it enough. Apparently 
Pulley mistakenly believes that an appellant must marshall the 
evidence as she has done, in the appendix of the brief. 
On the contrary, according to Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold 
Storage, et al,, 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the 
authority cited by Pulley, an appellant only needs to present the 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the finding being 
challenged. This can be done in the body of the argument, as 
Stokes has done. Stokes presents the evidence supporting the 
challenged finding, then the evidence contradicting the finding, 
citing the record along the way, then argues that the latter 
outweighs the former. 
Stokes followed the example of the appellants in Mountain 
States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(see appendix), who were praised by the Utah Court of Appeals for 
doing "an admirable job of marshalling the evidence," and 
supporting its challenges with "precise and thorough references to 
record evidence." Ld. at 554. What Pulley calls "an attempt to 
retry the matter" is actually a praiseworthy job of marshalling the 
evidence. Of course Pulley may marshall the evidence to present 
evidence that she believes Stokes has overlooked, but she has no 
basis for arguing that Stokes failed to satisfy the marshalling 
requirement. 
Pulley also faults Stokes for failing to cite any legal 
authority on this issue. That should be no surprise since the 
issue is challenging a finding of fact, 
V. Stokes Has Sufficiently Argued that the Parties Are Not 
Adjoining Landowners. 
With regard to the final issue, Pulley again argues that 
Stokes failed to marshall the evidence. However, the final issue 
is not challenging a finding of fact. Instead, it challenges a 
legal conclusion based on underlying facts that are not in dispute. 
Pulley also criticizes Stokes for straining to define "adjoining 
landowners" and for failing to cite Utah authority. Pulley, 
however, also fails to present any dispositive authority. She 
argues that "adjoining" means "continguous" which itself is defined 
as "adjoining." Since the law is uncertain in this area, the issue 
is suitable for appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Stokes has supported her position with sound legal and factual 
arguments and is entitled to reversal of the decision of the 
district court as she has requested. The arguments presented by 
Pulley in opposition, including the reasons she gives for attorney 
fees, are meritless, and should be disregarded by the court. 
DATED this J> day of January, 1998. 
HELEN H. ANDERSON, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN STATES 
BROADCASTING COMPANY, 
a corporation, and DAN 
LACY, an individual, 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
vs. 
STERRETT NEALE and NEALE 
BROADCAST ALLIANCE, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
Case No. 880192-CA 
Category 14b 
AMENDED BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
AMENDMENT 
This Amended Brief of Appellants amends and replaces the 
Brief of Appellants dated November 20, 1987. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The trial court entered its judgment after a non-jury 
trial. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-3(i) (1987). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Were the findings of the trial court clearly er-
roneous? 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to make any 
findings concerning plaintiffs' claim to recover extra payroll 
expense incurred by reason of defendant's breach of contract, 
and in failing to award plaintiff an offset for the amount of 
those lost wages? 
3. Did the trial court err in failing to make any 
findings concerning plaintiffs' claim to recover the $5,500 
offset for the defective equipment plaintiffs were required to 
give a subsequent purchaser by reason of defendant's breach of 
contract, and in failing to award plaintiffs an offset for that 
amount? 
4. Is cost of repair a proper measure of damages for 
breach of warranty where the evidence established the equipment 
could not be repaired? 
5. Where the promissory note provided that unpaid 
interest payments would bear "like interest as the principal," 
and where the principal bore annual simple interest, was it 
error to award interest compounded monthly? 
6. Were defendants entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees where the plaintiffs were the prevailing parties? 
1. Did the trial court err in granting defendants' motion 
to amend the judgment to provide for disbursal of funds on 
deposit to Sterrett Neale without affording plaintiffs an 
adequate time to file a response to the motion? 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, This is a declaratory judgment 
action to determine the amount of offset plaintiffs were 
entitled to by reason of defendants1 breach of certain warran-
ties in a contract for the purchase of a radio station. 
Defendants1 counterclaim sought damages and punitive damages by 
reason of plaintiffs' failure to pay amounts due under the 
contract. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below. 
This case was tried to the Court without a jury on September 15-
16, 1986. Sterrett Neale was dismissed at the beginning of 
trial (Tr. 2.) The trial court entered its Memorandum Decision 
on February 24, 1987, (R. 301-10) and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 312-24) and a Judgment (R. 325-27) were 
entered on March 24, 1987. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for New 
Trial or In the Alternative to Amend the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment on March 30, 1987 (R. 328-29), 
which motion was denied by ruling entered on April 15, 1987. 
(R. 358-59.) Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on April 
16, 1987. (R. 363.) Neale Broadcast Alliance filed a Notice of 
Cross-Appeal on April 29, 1987. (R. 377-78). 
Prior to the filing of the Notice of Appeal, on April 6, 
1987, defendants filed a motion seeking to amend the judgment to 
allow disbursal of the funds on deposit to Neale. The Order 
granting the motion was signed and entered on April 7, and the 
money was disbursed on April 15, 1987. Plaintiffs filed a 
3 
motion to vacate the order and compel a return of the funds on 
April 29. (R. 380-81.) The motion was denied by order entered 
on May 8, 1987. (R. 392-93.) Plaintiffs filed a Notice of 
Appeal from that order on June 5, 1987. 
Plaintiffs also filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus 
seeking the same relief on or about June 4. 1987. (Case No. 
870206.) The petition was denied on July 13, 1987. 
C. Statement of Facts. Mountain States Broadcasting 
Company ("Mountain States") is a corporation which operates 
radio stations, and in addition purchases and resells radio 
stations. In 1981, Mountain States was informed by a broker 
that an AM/FM radio station in Spanish Fork, Utah, was for sale. 
(Tr. 27.) The station, known as KONI (AM) and KTMP (FM) , had 
been owned and operated by defendant Neale Broadcast Alliance 
("Neale Broadcast") since 1977. (Tr. 220, 536.) Mountain 
States determined to purchase the station. (Tr. 28.) 
Dan Lacy, president of Mountain States, had a very brief 
opportunity to glance through the station prior to closing, and 
noted that some equipment was not working (Tr. 29) , and also 
learned that there were engineering problems which could be 
heard on the air. (Tr. 30-31.) Lacy wanted to delay the 
closing in order to allow the needed repairs to be made, but 
Neale Broadcast represented that it would be forced to file 
bankruptcy if closing did not occur as scheduled. (Tr. 145.) 
In order to avoid the additional problems that would be en-
gendered by a bankruptcy filing, Mountain States agreed to 
4 
proceed to closing without waiting for the repairs to be made. 
(Tr. 38-39.) Closing occurred on June 29-30, 1984. (Tr. 34.) 
The Asset Purchase Agreement executed at closing included a 
warranty that the transmitting and studio equipment were in good 
repair and working order. (Exhibit 1, page 9, at paragraph 
4.2.3.) In response to plaintiffs' concerns about the quality 
of the equipment, Neale Broadcast further acknowledged in 
connection with the closing that ff[c]ertain of said equipment is 
not in [good operating] condition11 and that Neale Broadcast had 
an obligation to repair or replace the defective equipment. 
(Exhibit 6.) 
Lacy returned to the station the evening of closing (June 
30, 1984) and conducted a detailed inventory of the items 
missing or not working, using as a reference the list of 
inventory which was part of the Asset Sale Agreement. (Tr. 40; 
Exhibit 17.) He discovered numerous items which were either 
missing or inoperable. (Tr. 40-42; Exhibits 19, 20.) 
Due to Federal Communications Commission regulations, 
plaintiffs could not sell commercials on the AM portion of the 
station, but were nonetheless required to keep it on the air. 
(Tr. 45-46.) Plaintiffs had contemplated that they would, and 
had the equipment been operating would have been able to, 
operate the AM portion of the station using the automation 
equipment which was purchased with the station. (Tr. 49-50, 63, 
154-55.) The automation equipment did not, however, operate 
with any degree of reliability, and the trial court properly 
5 
found that it was not in good operating condition at the time of 
the transfer. (R. 316, para. 14.) 
Because the automation equipment did not work, plaintiffs 
were required to hire extra personnel to operate the AM portion 
of the station, at a total expense of $3,355.07. (Tr. 151-53; 
Exhibit 16.) 
Plaintiffs were subsequently able to sell the AM portion 
of the station to SACE Broadcasting, the principal of which was 
Chris Warden. The sale price according to the sale contract was 
$225,000.00, but plaintiffs were required to allow an additional 
offset of $5,500.00 because they could not comply with the same 
warranties concerning the condition of the equipment as Neale 
Broadcast had made to plaintiffs. (Tr. 59-60.) Plaintiffs had 
purchased the AM portion of the station from Neale Broadcast for 
$250,000.00. (Tr. 60.) Plaintiffs therefore incurred a loss of 
$30,500.00 on the sale of the AM portion of the station to SACE 
Broadcasting. 
Subsequent to the closing on June 30, 1984, and after Lacy 
had conducted his detailed inventory of the assets, plaintiffs 
made demand on Neale Broadcast to repair or replace the non-
functional and missing items. (Tr. 46-49; Exhibit 7-9.) 
(Detailed discussion of the evidence relating to the specific 
items claimed to be missing or not working is presented in 
connection with the argument.) When the demands were not 
honored, Mountain States brought this action for a declaration 
of its right to an offset against the purchase price and for an 
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injunction against actions by defendant which plaintiffs alleged 
were preventing the resale of the station. 
In connection with filing this action, Mountain States 
deposited a check for $89,587.16 into court, and obtained an 
Order to Show Cause directing the defendants to show cause why 
they should not be enjoined from interfering with the resale of 
the radio station and further restrained from foreclosing their 
mortgage on the real property. At the hearing on the Order to 
Show Cause, the parties settled the issues pending trial by 
agreeing to the following: Plaintiffs were permitted to 
withdraw the check for $89,587.16, and in exchange paid the sum 
of $59,587.16 to defendants and redeposited the sum of 
$30,000.00 into court.1 Plaintiffs were also directed to 
deposit an additional $15,000.00 as a bond for attorney's fees.2 
Defendants deposited a Certificate of Deposit for $10,000.00 as 
a bond for attorney's fees. Defendants further agreed to not 
interfere with the resale of the station. (R. 33-35.) 
This matter was tried before the court, without a jury, on 
September 15-16, 1986. The court took the matter under advise-
ment and entered its memorandum decision on February 24, 1987. 
Formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a judgment 
1
 The $59,587.16 was paid to defendants on or about May 
31, 1983, shortly after the Order to Show Cause hearing. The 
$30,000.00 was deposited and the $89,587.16 check withdrawn on 
or about July 24, 1984. 
2
 Plaintiffs posted the $15,000.00 deposit on or about May 
15, 1987, subsequent to the trial and the filing of the Notice 
of Appeal. 
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were entered on March 24, 1987. Plaintiffs' post-trial motions 
pursuant to Rule 59 were denied, and plaintiffs thereafter 
perfected this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's findings are contrary to the great weight 
of the evidence. The court found several items of equipment to 
be functional notwithstanding testimony from defense witnesses 
that the items were non-functional. Defense witnesses similarly 
established that several items were missing, contrary to the 
findings of the court. 
The trial court erroneously used cost of repair as the 
measure of damages for the Control Design brain, notwithstanding 
evidence that it was not repairable. 
Given the trial court's finding that the brain was in-
operable, it was error for the court to fail to award plaintiffs 
the extra payroll expense incurred by reason of defendant's 
breach of that portion of the contract. The trial court further 
erred in failing to award plaintiffs an offset for the $5,500.00 
credit plaintiffs had to allow a subsequent purchaser by reason 
of the defective equipment. 
Plaintiffs were the prevailing party in the court below, 
because they had acknowledged an obligation to pay the amounts 
tendered into court less whatever offsets were determined by the 
court. The court therefore erred in awarding attorneys' fees to 
the defendants. 
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The promissory note in question did not provide for the 
compounding of interest, but only for annual interest. 
Finally, because the money which had been deposited in 
court was improperly paid out to Sterrett Neale, any judgment 
rendered on remand should also be against Sterrett Neale 
personally. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO 
MISSING AND DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
A. Introduction and Standard of Review. Under the terms 
of the Asset Purchase Agreement, Neale Broadcast sold and 
Mountain States purchased, among other things, the following: 
The furniture, fixtures, machinery, equipment (in-
cluding the transmitter, antenna, ground system and 
other equipment), supplies, spare parts, inventory and 
all other tangible personal property owned by Seller 
and used or useful in the operation of the Stations, 
as described in Schedule 2 (attached) together with 
any replacements thereof or additions thereto made 
between the date hereof and the Closing Date. 
Exhibit 1, page 2, paragraph 2.1.1. 
The Schedule 2 referred to in the above provision contained 
a detailed list of all the personal property, categorized in 
seven main groups: transmitting equipment,8 AM studio equip-
ment, FM studio equipment, office equipment, AM vehicles, FM 
vehicles, and shop tools and test equipment. (Exhibit 1, 
3
 Schedule 2 does not contain the label of "transmitting 
equipment" but the transmitting equipment is listed together in 
one group on the first page of Schedule 2. 
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Schedule 2 (copy attached as Appendix G) .) The Asset Purchase 
Agreement further contained the following warranties: 
As of the Closing Date, all of the personal property 
listed in Schedule 2 which is presently in active use 
in the operation of the Stations will be in good 
repair and working order, unless otherwise noted on 
Schedule 2. The transmitting and studio equipment 
for the stations which are among the physical assets 
listed in Schedule 2 are in good repair and working 
order. In the event that such equipment is not in 
good repair and working order and/or does not comply 
with FCC requirements Seller agrees at its own expense 
to pay the cost of making such repairs or at its 
option, of installing such new equipment, as may be 
necessary to meet those standards as of the Closing 
Date. 
Exhibit 1 at page 9, paragraph 4.2.3. 
By this warranty, therefore, Neale Broadcast warranted that 
all of the transmitting and studio equipment (the first three 
categories on Schedule 2) were in good repair and working order. 
This warranty was not limited to only those items of transmit-
ting and studio equipment in active use. With respect to all 
other assets listed on Schedule 2, however, the warranty was 
limited to only those items presently in active use in the 
operation of the stations. 
Paragraph 6.2.1 of the Asset Purchase Agreement further 
provided that Neale Broadcast would indemnify Mountain States 
for "any and all damage or deficiency resulting from any . . . 
material breach of warranty . . . .M Paragraph 6.2.3 provided 
that Mountain States was entitled to set off any amount to which 
it was entitled to indemnification against the indebtedness 
evidenced by the Promissory Note, if Mountain States had first 
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made demand for indemnification which demand had not been 
honored by Neale Broadcast. 
Plaintiffs claimed that at least 23 items of equipment 
valued at least $11,500.73 and included on the Asset Purchase 
Agreement were missing when Mountain States took over on July 1, 
1982 (Exhibit 19), and that at least 20 additional items were 
not working, for an additional lost value of $40,566.71 (Exhibit 
20) . The claim of missing and inoperative equipment was based 
on an inventory Lacy performed on June 30, 1982, after the 
closing but prior to the time the Mountain States took over. 
(Tr. 40.) In that inventory, Lacy had compared what he could 
find in the station against the inventory list on Schedule 2 of 
Exhibit 1. 
The trial court found that "there were no material items 
missing" (R. 316, paragraph 15), and that the only items which 
were not in good repair and working order were a Control Design 
brain, which the court found would cost $3,000.00 to repair, and 
two carrousels, which the court found would cost $1,500.00 each 
to repair. (R. 304, paragraph 14.) The court accordingly 
allowed a total offset of $6,000.00 against the purchase price. 
Mountain States respectfully asserts, for the reasons set 
forth in detail below, that the trial courtfs findings with 
respect to missing and inoperable equipment are clearly 
erroneous. Mountain States acknowledges its obligation to 
marshall all the evidence concerning the contested findings, 
including that favorable to Neale Broadcast. Scharf v. BMG 
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Corp,, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). This court should 
reverse the judgment of the trial court, if, after examining all 
of the evidence in the record, it appears that those findings 
"are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made . . . .ff State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
B. Missing Equipment. Plaintiff's Exhibit 19, a copy of 
which is attached as Appendix J, set forth 23 items of equipment 
which plaintiff claimed were missing as of July 1, 1982. The 
trial court found that there are no material items missing. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that there was a genuine dispute in the 
evidence as to many of the items set forth on Exhibit 19, and 
that there is an adequate evidentiary support for the court's 
findings with respect to those items. With respect to at least 
five items of Exhibit 19, however, the court's finding is not 
supported by the evidence. These five items, and the value for 
each, are an oscilloscope ($120.00), Ampex Play-Back electronics 
($2,000.00), tape pre-amps ($178.05), stereo heads ($221.64) and 
noise and distortion meter ($377.80). The total of these is 
$2,897.49. 
Two oscilloscopes are listed on Schedule 2, one on page 1 
as part of the transmitting equipment, and another on the bottom 
of page 2 as part of the AM studio equipment. There was 
testimony that the oscilloscope which was part of the transmit-
ting equipment was not missing, but was located at the FM trans-
12 
mitting site on a mountain. (Tr. 478-79, 495.) With respect to 
the other oscilloscope, valued at $120.00, even defendant's 
witness testified that it was missing. (Exhibit 69, page 2, 
paragraph (1).) 
Defendant's witness similarly acknowledged that the noise 
and distortion meter, valued at $377.80, was missing. (Tr. 280, 
562) . 
The remaining three items are the Ampex Play-Back electro-
nics, and the tape pre-amps and stereo heads which were a part 
of it. Dan Lacy testified that they could not be located when 
he took an inventory on June 30, 1982. (Tr. 41.) George 
Culbertson, a defense witness and former owner of the stations, 
testified that the equipment could not be located when he took 
an inventory on December 12, 1983. (Exhibit 69, Page 2, 
paragraph (6).) Mr. Culbertson further noted, however, that 
these items were out of service. They are identified on 
Schedule 2 by asterisk as being "not in use". The fact that 
these items were not in use does not, however, vitiate Neale 
Broadcast's express warranty that they would be present in the 
station and would be operable. These items are included on 
Schedule 2 as part of the transmitting and studio equipment. 
Neale Broadcast made an unconditional warranty that those items 
which comprised the transmitting and studio equipment would be 
in good repair and working order. The undisputed evidence 
before the court was that the Ampex Play-Back electronics and 
the associated tape pre-amps and stereo heads were missing, and 
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plaintiffs should have been allowed an offset for the value of 
those items. 
C. Inoperable Equipment. Dan Lacy testified that each of 
the 20 items listed on plaintiffs1 Exhibit 20 were inoperable on 
July 1, 1984, the date Mountain States assumed operation of the 
stations. (Tr. 42.) The trial court found that the only items 
of equipment not in good repair and working order were the 
Control Design brain and two of the carrousels. The discussion 
below establishes that the court's finding was clearly erroneous 
and against the great weight of the evidence with respect to at 
least one additional carrousel and the items designated as 
cartel and Magnecord recorder. 
The cartel, a high speed random selection carrousel-type 
piece of equipment which played tape cartridges ("carts"), was 
valued at $2,498.53. Dan Lacy testified that it was inoperable 
on June 30, 1984. (Tr. 42.) Defendant's own witness, Malcolm 
Crawford, also testified that the cartel was inoperable and had 
been retired from active use. (Tr. 488-89.) There was no 
contrary testimony. The cartel was part of the AM studio 
equipment, and was accordingly warranted to be in good repair 
and working order regardless of whether it was in active use in 
the station. 
The defense witnesses acknowledged that the Magnecord 
recorder, valued at $834.26, was not functioning. (R. 494.) 
The Magnecord recorder was not in use at the time of the 
purchase but was part of the FM studio equipment listed on 
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Schedule 2 and accordingly was part of the express warranty that 
it would be in good repair and working order. (See Tr. 551.) 
Plaintiffs testified that all six carousel which were 
included in the sale were inoperable. The record and playback 
heads had been removed from some of the carrousels (Tr. 81, 
132), and various other problems rendered most of the other 
carrousels inoperable. (E.g.. Tr. 299, 320, 596.) Even Malcolm 
Crawford, a defense witness who was an engineer and worked at 
the station until the time of transfer, testified that only 
three of six carrousels were functional. (Tr. 472, 485) 
Defendant Sterrett Neale testified that he did not know whether 
the carrousels were operable at the time of transfer. (Tr. 
537.) The only testimony which would even remotely support a 
finding that only two of the carrousels were functional was that 
of Mike Smith, a defense witness who worked at the station as an 
announcer. He stated that, as far as he could recall, all seven 
of the carrousels (including the cartel), were in use and func-
tional at the time of transfer in June, 1982. (Tr. 420.) This 
statement was contrary to all other evidence presented, and 
clearly the great weight of the evidence was that no more than 
three carrousels were functioning. The trial court1s finding 
that five carrousels were functioning (i.e., only two carrousels 
were non-functional) is clearly erroneous. 
Plaintiff should be allowed an additional offset of at 
least $1,500.00, the amount found by the court to repair a 
carrousel, and in addition for the value of the cartel 
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($2,498.53) and Magnecord recorder ($834.26). The total of 
these items is $4,832.79. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING COST OF 
REPAIR FOR THE CONTROL DESIGN BRAIN RATHER THAN 
COST OF REPLACEMENT 
The trial court found that the Control Design brain 
("brain") was not in good repair and working order at the time 
of the transfer. The court further found that the estimated 
cost of repair to the brain was $2,000.00 to $3,000.00, plus 
parts, and accordingly found the cost of repair to be $3,000.00. 
(R. 316, paragraph 14.) 
Plaintiffs are not aware of any evidentiary support for the 
finding that it would cost $2,000.00 to $3,000.00 plus parts to 
repair the brain. Although some of the defense witnesses 
testified that the brain functioned properly, the trial court 
clearly discounted that testimony in determining that the brain 
did not function properly. Those defense witnesses who ac-
knowledged that the brain did not function properly also 
testified that it was not repairable. George Culbertson, the 
former owner of the stations, testified that he, in conjunction 
with a representative of the manufacturer, had attempted to 
repair the brain without success. (Tr. 262-63.) 
Although cost of repair is typically an appropriate measure 
of damages, it is not appropriate when the item in question can 
not be repaired. See Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117, 1122 n.7 
(Utah App. 1987). Plaintiffs established that the value of the 
16 
automation equipment was $25,000.00 to $35,000.00. (Tr. 72, 
189.) The initial cost of the brain was $13,104.05. (Exhibit 
1, Schedule 2.) 
Having found that the brain was nonfunctional and where the 
evidence clearly showed that the brain was not repairable, the 
trial court should have awarded an offset of at least 
$25,000.00 for the Control Design brain. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE EXTRA 
PAYROLL EXPENSE INCURRED BY REASON OF THE 
INOPERABLE CONDITION OF THE BRAIN. 
The trial court properly found that the Control Design 
brain was inoperable at the time plaintiffs purchased the radio 
stations from Neale Broadcast. Pursuant to the Asset Purchase 
Agreement, plaintiffs were accordingly entitled to offset 
against the purchase price "any and all damage or deficiency 
resulting from any . . . material breach of warranty . . . .fl 
(Exhibit 1, paragraphs 6.2.1 & 6.2.3.) In partial compliance 
with this contractual provision, the trial court allowed 
plaintiffs an offset for the cost of repairing the brain. The 
court failed, however, to also award plaintiffs their damages 
incurred by reason of the inoperable condition of the brain. 
Undisputed evidence at trial established that plaintiffs 
had contemplated when they purchased the radio stations that 
they would be able to operate the AM portion of the station 
using the brain and the other automation equipment which was 
part of the sale. Had the brain been functioning, plaintiffs 
17 
would have been able to so operate the station. Because the 
brain did not function properly, plaintiffs were required to 
hire additional personnel, at a total additional cost of 
$3,355.07, in order to operate the station. The trial court 
erred in failing to award plaintiffs an offset for that amount. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
AWARD PLAINTIFFS THE LOSS THEY 
INCURRED ON RESALE OF THE STATION 
BY REASON OF DEFENDANTS' BREACH OF 
CONTRACT. 
Plaintiffs purchased the AM portion of the station from 
Neale Broadcast for $250,000.00, and subsequently resold that 
portion of the station to SACE Broadcasting for $225,000.00. 
(Tr. 60.). Plaintiffs made the same warranty to SACE Broadcast-
ing concerning the condition of the equipment as Neale Broadcast 
had made to plaintiffs. Because Neale Broadcast did not honor 
its warranty to plaintiffs, plaintiffs accordingly were unable 
to comply with their warranty to SACE Broadcasting, and accord-
ingly were required to allow an additional offset of $5,500.00 
against the purchase price of $225,000.00. (Id.) 
Neale Broadcast offered no evidence to controvert the fact 
that plaintiffs were required to allow the additional $5,500.00 
offset by reason of Neale Broadcast's breach of its warranty. 
The trial court erred in failing to allow plaintiffs to assert 
this additional offset against the purchase price to Neale 
Broadcast pursuant to paragraph 6.2.3 of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPOUNDING INTEREST 
MONTHLY, WHERE THE PROMISSORY NOTE ONLY 
PROVIDED FOR SIMPLE INTEREST. 
The promissory note signed by plaintiffs included the 
following paragraph: 
This Note shall bear interest upon the unpaid 
principal balance hereof from the date hereof until 
paid, at a rate of ten percent (10%) per annum. Should 
interest not be paid when due, it shall thereafter 
bear like interest as the principal. 
Exhibit 2. 
Defendant asserted and the trial court held that this 
provision required that interest be compounded monthly. (R. 
314, paragraph 6.) 
Compound interest is not favored in the law, and will not 
be awarded unless clearly required by contract or statute. 
Watkins & Farber v. Whitelev, 592 P.2d 613 (Utah 1979); Xebek, 
Inc. v. Nickum & Spauldincr Associates, Inc., 43 Wash. App. 740, 
718 P.2d 851 (1986). The contract in this case does not clearly 
provide for compound interest. An example of a contract using 
similar language, but with a modification which provided for 
compound interest, is found in First American Title Insurance & 
Trust Co. v. Cook, 12 Cal. App. 3d 592, 90 Cal. Rptr. 645 
(1973). The contract in that case provided that " [s]hould the 
interest not be so paid it shall be added to the principal and 
thereafter bear like interest as the principal.11 90 Cal. Rptr. 
at 646 (emphasis added). The court held the contract to provide 
for compound interest. 
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The contract in the instant case, in contrast, only 
provides that unpaid interest payments shall bear Hlike interest 
as the principal." The principal bears simple, not compound, 
interest. Unpaid interest payments therefore bear simple 
interest only, not interest compounded monthly. 
This rule is further supported by the case of Xebek, Inc. 
v. Nickum & Spauldina Associates. Inc., 43 Wash. App. 740, 718 
P.2d 851 (1986). The contract in that case provided as follows: 
Payment shall be made within thirty (30) 
days after receipt of billing by REDRI. 
Late charges of li per month shall be 
applied to all billings which have not been 
paid within thirty (30) days after receipt. 
718 P.2d at 853. 
Even thought this contract provided for monthly interest on 
the entire amount of the unpaid billings, the court nonetheless 
held that "this language is not explicit enough so as to warrant 
as award of compound interest." Id. The language in the 
instant case similarly does not explicitly provide for the 
monthly compounding of interest, and the trial court erred in so 
holding. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO DEFENDANT WHERE 
PLAINTIFFS WERE THE PREVAILING PARTY, 
The trial court held that both parties had breached the 
contract, and accordingly awarded attorneys fees to each party. 
The recent case of Elder v. Triax Co.. 740 P.2d 1320 (Utah 
1987), however, appears to hold that there can be only one 
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prevailing party in an action, even where the plaintiff is 
awarded relief on its claim and defendant is awarded relief on 
its counterclaim. It is clear in this action that plaintiff was 
the prevailing party. 
In conjunction with filing their complaint herein, plain-
tiffs tendered into court the sum of $89,587.16, thereby 
acknowledging their obligation to pay to defendant the full 
amount owing under the contract, less such offsets as the court 
would allow. (R. 1-4; 47-51.) Defendants' counterclaim alleged 
that plaintiffs were in breach of the agreements by failing to 
make payments as required, and also alleged that the failure to 
make payments was malicious justifying an award of punitive 
damages. (R. 64-67.) 
The judgment of the court awarded plaintiffs judgment on 
their claims. Plaintiffs were found to be entitled to an 
offset. Although the court purported to also give Neale 
Broadcast judgment on its counterclaim, Neale Broadcast really 
recovered nothing more than what plaintiffs had acknowledged 
from the beginning Neale Broadcast was entitled to receive—the 
amount due under the promissory note less such offsets as 
determined by the court. The court denied defendants' claim for 
an award of punitive damages. 
Because plaintiffs were the prevailing parties in the 
litigation, therefore, plaintiffs were entitled to recover their 
attorney's fees, and it was error to award any attorneys fees to 
defendant. 
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POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELEASING TO 
STERRETT NEALE THE MONEY PREVIOUSLY 
DEPOSITED IN COURT BY PLAINTIFFS. 
The judgment entered by the trial court on March 24, 1987, 
provided that the money then held on deposit by the court clerk 
was to be released to the "defendant.,f (R. 326 para. 5.) The 
only defendant listed on the pleading heading for the judgment 
was Neale Broadcast Alliance. On April 6, defendants filed a 
pleading titled "Motion," which sought to have the judgment 
amended to provide that the funds on deposit be released to 
Sterrett Neale, and also to set forth Mr. Neale1s social 
security number. (R. 354-55.) A proposed Order accompanied the 
Motion, and it was signed by the court and entered the following 
day, April 7. (R. 356-57.) Plaintiffs had not yet had an 
opportunity to respond to the motion, and were not given any 
notice of the entry of the order. See Utah R. Civ. P. 77(d). 
On April 15, 1987, Sterrett Neale withdrew $37,238.77 and a 
certificate of deposit with a face amount of $10,000.00 from the 
court. (R. 361-62.) 
On April 16, 1987, plaintiffs filed and served their (1) 
Notice of Appeal (R. 363-64), (2) Motion for Stay or Injunction 
Pending Appeal and to Set Amount of Supersedeas Bond (R. 365-
66), and (3) Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs1 Motion for 
Stay or Injunction Pending Appeal and to Set Amount of Super-
sedeas Bond and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Release 
of Funds on Deposit. (R. 367-69.) Plaintiffs sought in the 
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motion and memorandum to have the funds which plaintiffs 
supposed were still on deposit serve as a supersedeas bond 
pending this appeal. Plaintiffs did not discover until after 
the filing of the motion and memorandum that the funds had 
already been disbursed. 
Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts 
and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah grants a period of ten 
days to respond to any motion except an ex parte or uncontested 
matter. Rule 6(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
for an additional three days where the motion is served by mail. 
Defendants1 motion was served on April 4. Plaintiffs9 response 
was filed on April 16, and was clearly timely. The trial 
court's signing of the order without allowing plaintiffs the 
specified time to respond was clearly improper. 
Defendants assert that the motion merely sought to correct 
a clerical error in the judgment, and that service of the motion 
was not required. The proposed amendment to the judgment, 
however, did not just add Sterrett Neale's social security 
number, but changed the payee of the judgment. 
Neale Broadcast Alliance was formally dissolved in October, 
1982. (R. 313, para. 3.) If plaintiffs are successful on this 
appeal and judgment entered against Neale Broadcast, it is 
probable that the corporate shell will have no assets. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that this Court cannot undo the 
wrongful release of the deposit. The money has already been 
disbursed. This Court should, however, provide that any 
23 
judgment entered on remand is enforceable against Sterrett Neale 
to the extent of the funds wrongfully disbursed to him. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of the trial court were contrary to the great 
weight of the evidence. The court failed to allow plaintiffs an 
offset for equipment which was undisputedly missing and valued 
at a total of $2,897.49, and for equipment which was undis-
putedly inoperable and valued at a total of $4,832.79. Plain-
tiffs were further entitled, based on undisputed evidence, to an 
additional offset of $3,355.07 for extra payroll expense 
incurred by reason of the defective equipment, and $5,500.00 for 
a loss incurred on resale of the station which was directly 
attributable to defendants' breach of the warranties concerning 
the equipment. The trial court further erred in awarding 
plaintiffs an offset of only $3,000.00 for the repair cost of 
the brain, where the evidence established that the brain was not 
repairable. The value of the brain was at least $25,000.00, so 
plaintiffs were entitled to an additional offset of at least 
$22,000.00. Plaintiffs were accordingly entitled to a total 
additional offset of at least $38,585.35. 
Plaintiffs were the prevailing party and it was error to 
award attorney's fees to defendant. The trial court further 
erred in awarding compound interest. 
This case should be remanded with directions to the trial 
court to allow an additional offset of $38,585.35, and to 
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reverse the portions of the judgment allowing defendants their 
attorney's fees and compound interest. 
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